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In this issue of Neuron, Shmuelof and Zohary use s
functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI) to f
demonstrate differential sensitivity of the ventral and t
dorsal cortical streams of visual processing to im- n
ages of objects and grasping hands, respectively. s
s
When we reach out and pick up our morning cup of r
coffee, it seems self-evident that our motor system w
makes use of the same visual representation that al- c
lows us to recognize the cup. This idea, commonplace r
in philosophy and much of visual neuroscience, is (
sometimes called the “assumption of experience-
based control,” the notion that it’s what we “see” that d
controls our visually guided movements (Clark, 2002). t
According to this view, the visual system creates a sin- a
gle general-purpose representation of the external o
world that provides a platform for both cognitive opera- a
tions as well as the real-time control of goal-directed b
actions. Evidence from a broad range of experiments, c
however, suggests that such a monolithic account of S
visual function is incorrect. Instead, the visual control t
of actions—from saccadic eye movements to skilled
t
grasping movements of the hand and limbs—appears
rto depend on visual mechanisms that are functionally
tand neurally separate from those mediating our percep-
vtual experience of the world.
sEvidence for the duplex nature of vision came initially
Ffrom studies of neurological patients with selective
“damage to one or the other of the two streams of visual
hprocessing that arise from early visual areas in the cere-
d
bral cortex: the ventral stream, which projects to the
w
inferotemporal cortex, and the dorsal stream, which
w
projects to the posterior parietal cortex (Figure 1). Pa-
w
tients with damage to the ventral stream are typically s
unable to perceive the size, shape, and orientation of s
objects. Remarkably, however, some of these patients j
continue to show normal preshaping and rotation of the l
hand when they reach out to grasp the very objects W
whose forms they fail to see. Other patients that have j
damage to their dorsal stream have great difficulty d
using vision to control object-directed grasping move- w
ments, even though they can describe the location, p
size, shape, and orientation of the goal object they fail f
to grasp correctly. To explain this double dissociation, o
it has been proposed that the two visual streams must p
carry out fundamentally different transformations on in- s
coming visual information (Goodale and Milner, 1992, m
2004). According to this account, the ventral stream s
transforms visual information into perceptual represen- o
tations, forming the visual foundation for our cognitive s
life, allowing us to recognize objects and understand l
their causal relations, to communicate with others t
about the world beyond our bodies, and to identify
goals and plan actions with respect to those goals. In S
contrast, the dorsal stream, which utilizes moment-to- h
moment information about the disposition of objects o
within egocentric frames of reference, mediates the o
acontrol of those goal-directed acts.The advent of neuroimaging, particularly functional
agnetic resonance imaging (fMRI), has provided addi-
ional support for the perception-action account of
entral and dorsal stream function. When subjects are
ngaged in tasks requiring that they use vision to rec-
gnize objects, they show selective activation in ventral
tream areas such as the lateral occipital area and the
usiform gyrus (Grill-Spector, 2003). In contrast, when
hey use vision to reach out and pick up objects, they
o longer show selective activation in these ventral
tream areas, but instead show activation in dorsal
tream regions, such as the anterior part of the intrapa-
ietal sulcus (Culham, 2004). These observations map
ell onto both the neuropsychological studies dis-
ussed earlier as well as single-unit studies of object
ecognition and object-directed grasping in monkeys
Goodale and Milner, 2004).
In this issue of Neuron, Shmuelof and Zohary (2005)
escribe the results of an fMRI experiment that takes
his double dissociation between perception and action
step further by demonstrating differential sensitivity
f the ventral and dorsal streams to images of objects
nd grasping hands. Shmuelof and Zohary scanned the
rains of normal volunteers as they viewed brief video
lips of a hand reaching out to grasp different objects.
ometimes the grasping hand was on the left side of
he screen and the object was on the right, and some-
imes their positions were reversed. Using three sepa-
ate lines of evidence, Shmuelof and Zohary demonstrate
hat ventral stream areas were selectively activated by
iewing the object, whereas dorsal stream areas were
electively activated by viewing the grasping hand.
irst of all, they showed that there was a pronounced
contralaterality” effect: the relative position of the
and and object on the left and right sides of fixation
etermined whether the dorsal or the ventral stream
as activated in the opposite hemisphere. In other
ords, dorsal stream areas on one side of the brain
ere activated more when the grasping hand was pre-
ented in the contralateral visual field, whereas ventral
tream areas were activated more when the target ob-
ect was presented in the contralateral field. A second
ine of evidence came from manipulations of the task.
hen the volunteers were required to attend to the ob-
ect, ventral stream areas were activated more than
orsal stream areas, while the opposite was the case
hen they attended to the grasping hand. In a final ex-
eriment, Shmuelof and Zohary took advantage of the
act that the level of fMRI activation in a region declines
r “adapts” when the stimulus driving that region is re-
eatedly presented. They found that repeated pre-
entations of video clips of the same grasping move-
ent resulted in selective adaptation in the dorsal
tream, whereas repeated presentations of the same
bject resulted in selective adaptation in the ventral
tream. Taken together, these findings provide compel-
ing support for the perception-action account of ven-
ral and dorsal stream function.
But notice that the dorsal stream activation in
hmuelof and Zohary’s experiment was driven not by
aving subjects grasp objects but by having them view
ther people’s grasping movements. One interpretation
f this interesting observation is that the dorsal stream
reas that mediate the visual control of grasping are
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329Figure 1. The Two Streams of Visual Processing Illustrated on the
Right Hemisphere of the Human Brain
The ventral stream arises from early visual areas and projects
eventually to the inferotemporal cortex. The dorsal stream also
arises from early visual areas but projects instead to the posterior
parietal cortex.also recruited during the recognition of grasping by
others. This account resonates with the results of a
number of single-unit studies that have identified neu-
rons in monkey brain that fire both when the monkey
grasps an object and when the monkey sees another
monkey (or even the experimenter) grasp the object
(Rizzolatti and Craighero, 2004). Although these so-
called “mirror neurons” were first found in premotor
cortex, they have also been observed in posterior pari-
etal cortex as well. In addition, there is accumulating
evidence for a similar “mirror system” in human premo-
tor and posterior parietal regions. It is important to re-
member, however, that the mirror system involves both
ventral and dorsal stream networks. Although it is un-
doubtedly true that dorsal stream mechanisms are re-
cruited during the recognition of actions in others, it
seems highly unlikely that these action networks can
do this all by themselves. In order for the relevant low-
level features of the moving hand to be extracted from
the visual array (and bound together), some sort of
scene parsing and object analysis must be carried out,
presumably by perceptual mechanisms in the ventral
stream.
Although the mirror system account is the one fa-
vored by Shmuelof and Zohary (2005), there are other
possible explanations as well. It could be the case, for
example, that viewing a grasping hand activates dorsal
stream areas, not because these areas are being re-
cruited for recognition per se, but rather because view-
ing the hand activates an intention to grasp, which in
turn activates grasping networks in the dorsal stream.
In other words, the subject might use ventral stream
mechanisms to recognize the hand qua hand, and this
recognition in turn might activate the intention to per-
form an action similar to that being performed by the
hand. This might be particularly likely in situations
where there are no other visual stimuli competing for
the subject’s attention (as was the case in Shmuelof
and Zohary’s experiment). Alternatively, it is possible
that viewing the grasping hand of another individual inthe normal workspace of one’s own hand activates
some sort of online control network that involves the
dorsal stream, even though the subject is not actually
grasping an object. Whatever the real explanation
might be, the results of Shmuelof and Zohary’s elegant
experiment remind us once more that (ultimately) the
brain did not evolve to enable us to think; it evolved to
enable us to act.
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